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Abstract
Notwithstanding the interest and importance of Szasz's position, it neglects the phenomena, the
real problems which take people to the clinic seeking treatment, and the conditionality of the
notion of individual responsibility.
The sociology of psychiatry – the ways in which psychiatry
is shaped by and shapes wider society and its values – is a
matter of enormous importance, because psychiatry has
major impacts of many people's lives, and it costs a lot of
money. Important but neglected, with some brave excep-
tions, among whom Szasz has ranked among the best few
for decades. One writer, on the other hand, especially one
who wants to make a point, tends to pursue one point,
and it is up to the reader to consider other points of view,
pros and cons, problems which are not addressed as well
as those which are solved. This present piece by Szasz is a
cogent and provocative summary of much of what he has
long argued, in the form of a proposal that secular
humanism is incompatible with scientific psychiatry.
Szasz sketches the two players, citing the website of the
Council for Secular Humanism as follows:
"Secular humanists reject authoritarian beliefs. They
affirm that we must take responsibility for our own lives
and the communities and world in which we live. Secular
humanism emphasizes reason and scientific inquiry, indi-
vidual freedom and responsibility, human values and
compassion, and the need for tolerance and cooperation."
And then psychiatry is characterised like this:
The term "psychiatry" refers to both the principles and
practices of this ostensibly medical specialty. It is neces-
sary to emphasize at the outset that, unlike typical medical
practices based on consent, typical psychiatric practices
rest on coercion.'
I imagine the credo of secular humanism would attract a
lot of well-wishers, at face value, give or take some inter-
pretations in tricky cases of some of the key terms espe-
cially in the second quoted sentence; but anyway,
generally fine sentiments. Psychiatry on the other hand
gets off to terrible start, what with having with an ill-
defined basis, medical but not really, and being typically
coercive. Since secular humanism values freedom, among
other things, and psychiatry operates by coercion, the
answer to the question Szasz raises at the start whether
they are compatible is just 'no'. The problem solves itself
as soon as it is formulated, and the rest of the piece is an
elaboration of the point.
Just the definitions of secular humanism on the one hand
and psychiatry on the other shows up the strength of
Szasz's conclusion clearly, but the easiness of it all signi-
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fies that hard problems are left invisible. What are the
hard problems?
First, much of mental health services are provided to vol-
untary consumers who walk through the clinic door ask-
ing for treatment. What can the kind of position adopted
by Szasz say about this? Perhaps that these people are vic-
tims of a delusion, of the same myth that defines psychia-
try? Or that they wish to shirk responsibility for their
feelings and behaviour? Deluded or feckless they may be,
but in any case apparently not responsibly seeking help
for something reasonably called a 'mental health prob-
lem'. So for example, consider the case of a 17 year old
young man finding that he is continually having thoughts
that his parents may have an accident, that to stop this
happening he is convinced that he has to undo the
thoughts by repeating what he was doing when he has
them without having them, that this takes hours, gets in
the way of revising for his state exams, seeing friends and
sleeping, believes that this all makes no real sense, finds
out on the net that he has what is called OCD and that it
is treatable (stoppable) by CBT, so goes looking for it. Is
such a man deluded, feckless, or responsibly taking care of
himself? Do we have to choose one of the first two
options? Or can we go with the third? If the first two, what
should the young man be doing in his predicament? Or is
it, despite appearances, not a predicament at all? What
should the therapist he contacts do? What does the posi-
tion adopted by Szasz recommend we say and do in such
a case? These are the day to day problems and questions
that are apparently passed by in Szasz's critique of psychi-
atry. And abstract debates about such as individual free-
dom, and whether so-called mental health problems are
or are not brain disorders, just get us to ignore them.
In the coercive case, what should be done instead? What
should be done with a person – let us say a mother of two
young children and a new baby to make the case a hard
one – who has so-called 'post-natal depression' and in this
so-called depressed state expresses clear intent to kill her-
self, with attempts, and a clear choice not to have treat-
ment? What should be done? Leave her to it?
These are the practical problems, in both kinds of case,
voluntary treatment-seeking and coercive treatment, that
keep people with the problems, their families, and the
professionals, awake at night. We all need to know what
we should do instead, if not follow the current arrange-
ments. The credo of the Council for Secular Humanism
was presumably not designed to get involved with these
practical problems, and nor is Szasz's piece.
Behind all this it may be that the real issue is not about
what are called mental health problems and its manage-
ment, which would be why little is said about them, but
about the role of the state. After introducing the defini-
tions that make it clear that psychiatry is incompatible
with the ideals of secular humanism, Szasz continues:
In a free society, most social relations between adults are
consensual. Consensual relations – in business, medicine,
religion, and psychiatry – pose no special legal or political
problems. In contrast, coercive relations – one person
authorized to use the power of the state to compel another
person to do or abstain from an action of his choice – are
inherently political and morally problematic.
It is a secure and comfortable world in which consensual
relations pose no special legal or political problems, in
which these problems are raised only by a coercive state:
one source of problems, which comes with its own built-
in solution, curtailing the power of the state. But what
here is said about consensual relations between two par-
ties that spike a third – not an unusual position after all?
Or are these consensual relations that damage a third
party illegal, regulated by law, backed up by a coercive
state, which would then not be so bad after all? How is the
argument meant to run here? Apparently the state has to
regulate the behaviour of citizens and corporations in
many ways, to make it work at all. There is after all no
property without property law, no trade without con-
tracts, nor indeed is there freedom to act without law
which protects the individual against coercion by another.
Further, law itself rests on the notion of individual respon-
sibility for action. This notion is fundamental to the kind
of position adopted by Szasz, fundamental and unques-
tioned, secure and comfortable. But the assumption of
individual responsibility only seems this way when we
ignore all the many kinds of problematic cases in which it
is questionable, problems that exercise the legislators and
the courts, how to judge individual responsibility in cases
involving such as corporate misdemeanours or war
crimes, for example, or involving minors, the seriously
physically ill, the state of people in altered/uncharacteris-
tic states of consciousness for various reasons and causes,
and of people with severe so-called 'mental health prob-
lems'. If it is to be understood adequately, mental health
law that warrants coercion has to be discussed in the con-
text of problems such as these that interrogate the
assumption of individual responsibility and freedom, not
only in the assumption of free, autonomous, responsible,
value-laden and cooperative individuals managing things
for themselves for the best.